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In the Sttpreme Court of the
State of Utah
ALTON H. DAVIS, by and through
his Guardian, George A. Davis,
Appellant,
vs.
PROVO CITY CORPORATION,
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY, a
corporation, and ROBERT S. CLARK,
Respondents.

CASE
NO. 7905

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT PROVO CITY
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case is before the Supreme Court to test whether
or not appellant's complaint states a cause of action upon
which relief can be had. The facts set forth in appellant's
brief, insofar as they are consistent with those contained
in the cornplaint, should be admitted by defendant Provo
City for all purposes incidental to a determination of that
question. It may be noted, however, that defendant Provo
City would controvert substantially all ·of the alleged facts
upon a trial on the 1nerits.
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POINTS RELIED UPON
POINT 1
APPELLANT'S COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE
A CAUSE OF ACTION BASED ON NEGLIGENCE
AGAINST RESPONDENT PROVO CITY.
POINT 2
APPELLANT'S COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE
A CAUSE OF ACTION BASED UPON THE DOCTRINE
OF ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE AGAINST RESPONDENT
PRO\T!O CITY.

ARGUMENT
POINT 1
The Utah Statutes. provide that every claim against
a city for damages or injury from negligence of the city in
respect to any street, alley, etc., shall within thirty days
after the happening of such injury or damage be presented
to the Board of Commissioners. Utah Code Annotated,
1943, Title 15-7-76.
Appellant's complaint alleges that the injury occurred
on December 7, 1951, an~ that the claim for damages was
filed with the city on the 8th day of January, 1952. Obviously, therefore, it appears on the face of the complaint that
the claim was not presented within the time required by
law. Failure to present such claim to the governing body
of the city within the time specified in Title 15-7-76 shall
be a sufficient bar. Utah Code Annota~, 1943, Title 157-77. Presentation of claim within time fixed by law is a
condition precedent to bringing action against a town. Hurley v. Town of Bingham, 63 Utah 589, 228 P. 213; Nelson
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v. Logan City (Utah), 135 P. (2) 259; Peterson v. Salt Lake
City (Utah), 221 P. (2) 591; White v. Heber City (Utah),
26 P. (2) 333; Sehy v. Salt Lake City, 41 Utah 535, 126
P. 691.
It is impossible to escape the conclusion, from the facts
alleged in appellant's complaint, that negligence chargeable
to the city, if any, arose in respect of a street. However,
appellant does not argue that aspect of the case, but seems
to rest only upon the question of general negligence on the
part of the city relating to a coasting area, not in respect
of a street.
Parks, playgrounds, coasting areas, etc., provided by
a city for the general enjoyment of its citizens, ,constitute
a public or governmental function, as distinguished from a
proprietary undertaking. In connection with such governmental function a municipality may not be held liable for
negligence of its servants or agents. Alder v. Salt Lake
City, 64 Utah 568, 231 P. 1102; Principle reaffirmed in
Husband v. Salt Lake City (Utah), 69' P. (2) 491, 494.
Niblock v. Salt Lake City, 100 Utah 573, 111 P. (2) 800.
See also, Abbott v. City of Des Moines, 298 N. \V. 649. The
action of the municipality in designating a street or area
for coasting was solely for the common enjoyment of the
inhabitan-ts of the city, and was entirely without the element of special corporate benefit or pecuniary profit. There
is no allegation that any charge or fee was imposed or in~lcQuillin-Municipal Corporation, 3rd Edition,
tended.
Vol. 18, Pages 194, 195, 196, states:

"The doctrine exempting a Municipal Corporation
from private action for torts resulting from the performance of its governmental functions, steadily adhered to by the most recent judicial decisions . . . .
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is based on the familiar reason that the undertaking
is not to promote the private interests of the municipality as a corporate entity, but rather for the public
benefit, and in the performance of such obligation the
municipality is a mere public agent, either of the state
or of the local community."
See also the list of authorities therein collected, including Burton v. Salt Lake City, 69 Utah 186, 253 P. 443. The
cases cited by the appellant do not reflect the law as shown
by the more recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Utah,
nor by the weight of authority from other jurisdictions.
Moreover, even conceding that there was negligence
chargeable to defendant Provo City, plaintiff's complaint
is still fatally defective, for the complaint shows that neg~igence, if any, on the part of said defendant was not a
proximate cause of the injury complained of. An entirely
different party or person, not connected in any way with
either Provo City or defendant Brigham Young University,
is shown to have been the moving factor without which the
accident in question would not have taken place. See Davis
v. Mellen, 55 Utah 9, 189 P. 920.
POINT 2
Appellant's complaint fails to state a cause of action
against Provo City based on the Doctrine of attractive nuisance.
The difference between attractive nuisance and negligence is that in attractive nuisance the wrongfulness is in
doing the act at all, ,while negligence arises from the mere
failure to exercise ordinary or reasonable care in the performance of the act. See llusband v. Salt Lake city, supra.
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It has been said that nuisance arises from an absolute duty
not to do, while negligence involves requisite care in the
doing.
Appellant does not allege or contend that Provo City
had an absolute duty to refrain from designating the coasting area in question. The claim is based upon the alleged
fact that the city did "willfully and negligently fail to take
any steps to guard or protect the children against injury."
Appellant's Complaint. There is no allegation that the city,
aside from indicating that the hill could be used for coasting, did anything except place a "saw horse" at the bottom
of the hill. There is no claim that the "saw horse" was of
itself a dangerous instrumentality, or that the child was injured while playing with the "saw horse."
By merely designating an existing street or roadway
as a coasting area, has the city created an attractive nuisance? We think not. While we have been unable to find
a Utah case directly deciding the question, the Supreme
Court of Washington, in Gerritson v. City of Seat~, 2 P.
(2) 1092, held as a matter of law, that the closing of a street
as a playground for children was not a nuisance.
Moreover, in seeking to charge the city with liability
for injury due to attractive nuisance, notice thereof, either
actual or constructive, is required. McQuillan, Municipal
Corporations, 3rd Edition, Volume 18, Page 275 and cases
there collected. From appellant's complaint it appears that
the injury complained of was sustained on about the same
day that the coasting area was allegedly designated by the
city. The complaint does not even allege that the city had actual or constructive notice of any hidden danger or that the
coasting area itself could prove a dangerous instrumentality.
We think appellant's claim must fail for this reason also.
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CONCLUSION

It' is manifest that the appellant's complaint does not
state a cause of action against respondent Provo City upon
which any relief could be obtained and that the decision of
the lower court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
CLAIR M. ALDRICH,
Attorney for Respondent
Provo City
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